Search results for "Out-of-body experience"
showing 4 items of 4 documents
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood.
2008
We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the ‘I’ of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent e…
The Relationship Between Dissociative Experiences and Cannabis Use: a Systematic Review
2019
Purpose of Review This systematic review aimed to investigate the relation between cannabis use and dissociation. Recent Findings Four analytical and 14 descriptive cross-sectional studies were included. There is no variation in the rates of cannabis use among individuals with dissociative experiences compared with the general population. In addition, the prevalence of dissociative disorders in subjects using cannabis is not different from those not using cannabis. The majority of the studies employed inadequate sampling procedures and a concurrent or retrospective assessment of the two variables, which might have increased the risk of bias, and only a few of them controlled for potential c…
Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research1
2013
This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and ful…
Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research.
2013
This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of “minimal phenomenal selfhood,” which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and ful…